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THE 1993 ST. IVES LECTURE*
NATURAL LAW AND CIVIL RIGHTS: FROM
JEFFERSON'S "LETTER TO HENRY LEE" TO
MARTIN LUTHER KING'S "LETTER
FROM BIRMINGHAM JAIL"
Robert P. George**
Ever since Jeremy Bentham scorned the idea of natural or moral rights
as no ordinary nonsense, but "nonsense upon stilts,"' a certain stream of
thought about rights has held them to be merely conventional and histori-
cally contingent. According to the conventionalist or historicist view,
moral rights cannot come as a divine gift because there is no divine giver;
nor can they derive from human nature because there is no determinate
human nature. Moral rights, according to conventionalists and his-
toricists, exist only in the sense that certain people, or peoples, happen to
believe-as a contingent matter of fact, that is, subjectively-that rights
exist and are willing to honor them. Where people, or peoples, do not
happen to believe in their existence, rights simply do not exist.
Now historicists and conventionalists do not doubt the existence of
legal rights. For legal or "positive" rights can easily be accommodated
and accounted for in historicist and conventionalist terms. What they
deny, and what theorists of natural law and natural rights affirm, is that
legal rights can embody or express moral rights that are not merely con-
tingent and conventional. In other words, the issue dividing historicists
and conventionalists, on the one side, and partisans of natural law and
* This Article is adapted from a lecture delivered on April 21, 1993, at the Columbus
School of Law, The Catholic University of America, as part of the St. Ives Lecture Series.
** Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton University; Of Counsel, Robinson & Mc-
Elwee, Charleston, W. Va.; Commissioner, United States Commission on Civil Rights;
B.A. Swarthmore College; M.T.S. and J.D. Harvard University; D. Phil. Oxford Univer-
sity. The views expressed herein are the author's own and are not necessarily those of any
organization with which he is affiliated.
1. JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, in 2 THE WoiuKS OF JEREMY BrNTHAM
489, 501 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
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natural rights, on the other, is whether positive law can be designed to
embody, or can validly be criticized for failing to embody, objective or
true principles of justice. Such principles are principles that people, or
peoples, have sound reasons to hold and honor whether or not they hap-
pen to hold and honor them in fact.
Any serious student of civil rights must inquire into the moral ground
and epistemic status of civil rights. Is the mode of existence of civil rights
simply historically contingent and conventional? That is, do civil rights
come into being merely at some specific time and place, and then possibly
disappear as "history" or experience unfolds?
To be sure, our civil rights, as the rights of citizens of this nation, con-
sidered as legal rights-i.e., as rights that are posited legislatively and en-
forceable in court-are certainly historically contingent. Laws, including
laws that create rights, are human artifacts. They come into force by au-
thoritative enactment, and they can, by authoritative act, be repealed.
They may exist as legal fact at one historical moment and not at another.
Their existence or nonexistence in a positive code depends on human acts
of positing and enforcing them. Thus, they can and do change.
Abraham Lincoln expressed the relation between the time-bound histo-
ricity and the timeless rationality of the principle of equal rights in his
1857 speech on the Dred Scott v. Sanford2 decision. He said of those who
had written the Declaration of Independence that
[t]hey defined with tolerable distinctness, in what respects they
did consider all men created equal-equal in "certain inaliena-
ble rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness." This they said, and this they meant. They did not mean
to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually en-
joying that equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it
immediately upon them. In fact they had no power to confer
such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right, so that the
enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances should
permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society,
which should be familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly
looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never per-
fectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly
spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the hap-
piness and value of life to all people of all colors everywhere?
If there are objective or true principles of justice (such as the principle
of equality) that constitute a higher standard, then legislative action may
2. 60 U.S. (2 How.) 393 (1857).
3. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in 2 THE CoL-
LEcrED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 398, 405-06 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953).
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be rationally guided and criticized in the light of those principles; and
legal rights, or the absence of certain legal rights, can be judged morally
good or bad. Authoritative actors in a legal system may fail to secure or
enforce a right that, morally speaking, ought to be secured and enforced;
or they may posit and enforce a right that ought not to be posited and
enforced. For example, the law might unjustly fail to give a certain class
of human beings a legal right not to be enslaved or arbitrarily killed; that
is, it might unjustly confer upon another class a legal right to enslave or
kill them. The justice or injustice of such acts of positive law is measured
by reference to standards of the higher law, i.e., the moral law, that are
objective or true eternally and universally.
Wo weeks before Justice Thurgood Marshall resigned from the
Supreme Court, I sat in my office in Princeton chatting with then-Judge
Clarence Thomas who was in town to address a judicial education semi-
nar. I was, at the time, putting together the volume of essays that has
now appeared under the title Natural Law Theory,4 and our discussion
turned to the question of natural law and civil rights. However much
Judge Thomas' confirmation hearings left the public confused about his
ideas of natural law and natural rights, he made his position on the issue
crystal clear to me: "Those who deny natural law," he said, "cannot get
me out of slavery."5 Of course, Justice Thomas was not suggesting that
contemporary historicists or conventionalists-"those who deny natural
law"-believe in slavery, and he well knows that some nineteenth century
believers in natural law argued for a natural right to own slaves. His
point was that the moral relativism that informs historicist and conven-
tionalist accounts of rights precludes the proponents of such accounts
from offering a rational moral argument against slavery. All they can say
is that once upon a time in this country white people had the legal right to
own black people, and now black people (and, indeed, all people) have
the legal right not to be enslaved. For the latter proposition they can cite
the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Their his-
toricism and conventionalism preclude them, however, from saying that
the Thirteenth Amendment embodies or gives legal force to a moral or
natural right not to be enslaved. Under their account, no one would have
had objective moral reasons (though some could have had economic or
other instrumental or nonmoral reasons) to support the abolition of slav-
ery. Of course, people may have believed (and acted upon their belief) in
a natural right not to be enslaved, which provided a moral reason for
4. NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
5. Interview with Clarence Thomas, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, in Princeton, NJ. (June, 1991).
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them to support abolition, but this subjective belief, under the historicist
and conventionalist account, lacked a rational ground. That is to say, it
was in no sense rationally superior to the belief of other people that no
such right existed or, indeed, that they had a right to own slaves. It also
follows that neither history nor convention could provide an adequate
rational defense against the return in the future of some form of slavery.
Like Justice Thomas, I reject historicism and conventionalism in favor
of the natural law and natural rights position. It is probably true, how-
ever, that in this respect we are in the minority in today's legal and aca-
demic communities. We can, however, take comfort at finding ourselves
in agreement with America's greatest statesmen, from Jefferson to Lin-
coln to Martin Luther King. They-and the central philosophic tradition
of which they were, in turn, our nation's principal bearers-argued that
the basis of civil rights and liberties was natural law and the natural rights
that derive from the natural law.
Let me pay what is due to the natural law skeptics of our day: the cen-
tral tradition was by no means clear and united on the meaning or con-
tent of the natural law. But the proponents of natural law in all its
varieties-from the pagan Aristotle to the Christian St. Thomas Aquinas,
from Enlightenment philosophers such as Locke to Jefferson, Lincoln,
and, not least of all, King-would probably all have been appalled to hear
that natural law thinking is irrelevant or dangerous, which was the con-
ventional view expressed again and again during round one of Justice
Thomas' confirmation hearings.
If the official act of foundation of the American regime was the publi-
cation of the Declaration of Independence-as our Founders themselves
plainly believed-then at the basis of American republicanism is the ex-
plicit recognition of "the Laws of Nature and Nature's God."6 In justify-
ing the act of independence, the Declaration says that we Americans
"hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."7 Jefferson,
the author of these immortal lines, acknowledged that there was nothing
new about the natural law and natural rights philosophy of the Declara-
tion. Years later, he wrote to Henry Lee that it was
[n]ot to find out new principles or new arguments never before
thought of, nor merely to say things which had never been said
before, but to place before mankind the common sense of the
6. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
7. Id. at para. 2.
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subject .... [I]t was intended to be an expression of the Ameri-
can mind, and to give to that expression the proper tone and
spirit called for by the occasion. All its authority rests then on
the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in
conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary
books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc.8
Notice that according to Jefferson, these writers-two ancients and two
modems-described ideas of natural law in their "books of public right."
That there were significant differences among these thinkers about the
content of natural law was less important than their shared confidence
that there is such a moral-political reality that is accessible to reason and
that supplies theoretical justification for "public right." Jefferson was cer-
tain that the idea of natural law is "common sense"-that is, something
ordinary citizens can and do understand-and that this common sense
rests on certain "harmonizing sentiments of the day"-some core set of
beliefs about which citizens, whatever their disagreements, could come to
agreement.
Despite all the differences among the greatest minds that ever applied
themselves to the fields of ethics and politics, there is one proposition on
which those within the natural law tradition agree, namely, that human
nature is, in significant respects, determinate, unchanging and structured.
This does not mean that human nature is a closed nature;9 for practical
knowledge-knowledge of what is morally right and good for man-is
not knowledge of what is (already) the case, but, rather, knowledge of
what is to be (and ought to be) done, that is, knowledge of possible
human fulfillment through rationally motivated action.' 0 Because human
beings as practically rational agents can understand and act upon reasons
provided by the basic goods of human nature, they, unlike beings whose
natures are closed, possess the capacity for free choice. Thus, human be-
ings are capable of understanding a moral law, a law of practical reasona-
bleness, constituted by principles of right reason in practical affairs."
The standard historicist and conventionalist argument against natural
law and natural rights appeals to the brute fact of moral diversity in the
8. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), in T7m POLITICAL
WRmNGs OF THoMAs JEPFERSON 88 (Edward Dumbauld ed., 1955).
9. See generally Robert P. George, Natural Law and Human Nature, in NATURAL
LAW THEoRY, supra note 4, at 31 (arguing that human nature is not a closed nature).
10. See generally Germain Grisez et al., Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate
Ends, 32 AM. J. Jums. 99 (1987) (responding to criticisms of natural law theory).
11. On practical reasonableness, see generally JoHN FmNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NAT-
uIRAL MoHr's 100-33 (1980).
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world.12 Different people, and peoples, hold or have held, different and
conflicting beliefs about issues such as slavery, racial segregation and
abortion. From this observable fact, standard historicists and convention-
alists conclude that there is no moral truth, no natural law. But this infer-
ence is unwarranted. The existence of moral truth is logically compatible
with any range of moral diversity. As Leo Strauss observed:
[K]nowledge of the indefinitely large variety of notions of right
and wrong is so far from being incompatible with the idea of
natural right that it is the essential condition for the emergence
of that idea: realization of the variety of notions of right is the
incentive for the quest for natural right."3
A different objection to the idea of natural law and natural rights is its
alleged incompatibility with a legitimate range of human freedom, ways
of life and diversity of choices. 4 But this argument fares no better. In
the first place, it appears to be self-referentially inconsistent inasmuch as
it presupposes a moral obligation to respect freedom and diversity as a
matter not of mere convention, but of natural justice or natural rights. It
is, in short, a palpably moralistic critique of moral objectivity. Second,
the argument misses its target; because the belief that some choices and
ways of life are objectively morally wicked does not entail the proposition
that there is always a single correct choice or way of life. Natural law
theorists recognize a legitimate variety of choices and ways of life that
reflect the spectrum of human goods as well as the diverse opportunities
and legitimate ways that people can realize and instantiate these goods.
Natural law theory has never demanded uniformity or celebrated
conformism.
15
Now historicism and conventionalism are, so to speak, polite expres-
sions of skepticism. They are, however, unstable. This politeness is not
principled, but reflects the habits of civility or the mild temperament of
12. Versions of this argument are advanced by MELVILLE J. HERSKOVrrs, CULTURAL
RELATVISM (Frances Herskovits ed., 1972) and J.L. MACIE, ETIcs: INVENTING RIrr
AND WRONG (1977). For powerful defenses of natural law and natural rights against argu-
ments for relativism and skepticism that appeal to moral diversity, see HADLEY ARES,
FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND JusmicE (1986)
and Jon FIN is, FuNDAmENTALs OF ETmCS (1983).
13. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 10 (1953).
14. This objection is asserted against the natural law theorizing of Germain Grisez and
John Finnis in Bernard Hoose, Proportionalists, Deontologists and the Human Good, 33
HEYTHROP J. 175 (1992). For a defense of this sort of theorizing against Hoose's critique,
see Robert P. George, Liberty Under the Moral Law: On B. Hoose's Critique of the Grisez-
Finnis Theory of Human Good, 34 HEYTROP J. 175 (1993).
15. On the compatibility of natural law theory with recognition of legitimate pluralism
and diversity, see generally ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIL LIBERTIES
AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1993).
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intellectuals who happen to hold these positions. But others may be
found, of stronger will and greater ambition, who reject natural law.
Moreover, they are not constrained by politesse from drawing the truly
radical conclusions that flow from the proposition that there are no objec-
tive standards of justice and right. They correctly reason that if man is
radically free-free from any standards of practical reasonableness,
which is to say, morality-then, as Nietzsche put it, "all things are permit-
ted."16 This suggests that men are free to pursue their desires and inter-
ests, whatever they happen to be; they are, that is to say, morally free,
whether or not they are legally free, to deny freedom to others, to manip-
ulate, exploit, even enslave them. Where reason has no sway in practical
affairs, the sole question is who has the power. And the powerful have
no reason to spare the weak. The radical or nihilist critique of moral
objectivity understandably, on its own terms, denounces natural law
thinking as a "slave morality.",
17
The instability of historicism and conventionalism leads to a conclusion
worth pondering, namely, that the choice for us is not natural law or free-
dom, as Clarence Thomas' liberal critics suggested; the choice is natural
law, and a morally ordered freedom based on natural law, or nihilism.
Prior to the revolution in, or as some say, the invention of, philosophy
by Socrates, law (nomos) meant the conventional and nature (physis) was
regarded as its opposite. We hear tentative beginnings of natural law ar-
gumentation in Plato, who puts the opposed terms "nature" and "law"
together only twice, I believe, in his corpus-neither time suggesting a
nonconventional rule of equity. The Platonic Socrates does not speak of
natural law-for Plato a paradox-but of that which is "right by nature,"
or "natural right."'
Yet in the dialogue Minos, or On Law, Socrates does suggest that there
is some unwritten transcendent standard of "worthiness" and "wicked-
ness" that disqualifies bad laws (nomoi) from being considered truly
16. For two excellent analyses of Nietzschean nihilism, see STAmEY ROSEN, NIHILISM:
A PILOsoPHIcAL EssAy at xiii, xiii-xx (1969) and Werner J. Dannhauser, Friedrich Nietz-
sche, ln HISTORY OF POLrrcAL PHILosoPHY 829, 842 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds.,
3d ed. 1987).
17. In the original debate about natural justice in the western philosophic tradition,
Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic anticipates Nietzsche's "transvaluation of values" when
he declares under Socrates's relentless questioning that "the just is nothing other than the
advantage of the stronger." PLATO, TmE REPUBLIC 338C (Allan Bloom, trans., 2d ed.
1968). Cf. FRIEDICH W. Nmrzsmc, THE AmnIumsT, reprinted in Tm PORTABLE
NmZmCHE 565,568 (Walter Kaufmann, ed. & trans., 1954); FRIEDRICH W. NIrEzscHn, On
the Genealogy of Morals H.17, app. 92, reprinted in ON THm GENEALOOY OF MoRALSAN
EccE HoMo 1, 86, 168-69 (Walter Kaufmann ed., Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale
trans., 1969).
18. PLATO, supra note 17, at 501b.
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law. 9 Moreover, in Xenophon's Memorabilia, Socrates mentions an un-
written law against incest that is enforced by the natural penalty of having
ill-begotten offspring.20
Plato's more confident successor, Aristotle, developed the system of
ethics from which the tradition of natural law theorizing emerged. Like
Socrates and Plato, Aristotle does not speak of "natural law," yet he
writes of an unchanging "law based on nature."21 Practical reason, in
Aristotle's ethical writings, is concerned with discovering this law by ra-
tional inquiry and putting it into effect in human affairs.
A self-conscious commitment to the idea of natural law is more fully
evidenced, however, in the writings of Cicero, who mentions it repeat-
edly. He says, for example, that
"law . .. is the highest reason implanted in nature, which
prescribes those things which ought to be done, and forbids the
contrary." And when this same reason is confirmed and estab-
lished in men's minds, it is then law.
[The Romans] therefore conceive that prudence is a law,
whose operation is to urge us to good actions, and restrain us
from evil ones.22
Now remember that these early natural law philosophers were ignorant
of the revealed teachings of Sacred Scripture. Therefore, we may put to
rest the oft-expressed objection that belief in natural law is a sectarian
religious doctrine. To the contrary, on its own terms, whether advanced
by pagans, Christians, or Jews,' natural law philosophy seeks to vindicate
principles accessible to, and thus binding upon, every reasonable person.
If natural law is based upon "faith," it is a faith in reason, and in the
possibility of practical reason in particular. It is as much the opponent of
religious doctrines that deny the power of practical reason and make all
ethical principles nothing but matters of divine command as it is the en-
emy of the nihilist doctrine that replaces the quest for rationality in ethics
with the pure will to power.
It is precisely because the natural law is held to be accessible to reason
and thus binding on all rational persons irrespective of religious faith or
its absence that St. Paul can say in his Letter to the Romans that
19. PLATO, MINOs 314e, reprinted in THE RooTs OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: TEN
FORGOTrEN SocRATIc DIALOGUES 53, 55-56 (Thomas L. Pangle ed. & trans., 1987).
20. XENOPHON, MEMORABILIA AND OECONOMICUS IV.iv.17-23 (E.C. Marchant trans.,
1923).
21. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC 1.1373b (George A. Kennedy trans., 1991).
22. CICERO, On the Laws I.vi.12-19, reprinted in THE TREATISES OF M.T. CICERO 398,
406 (C.D. Yonge trans., 1878).
23. On natural law in the Jewish tradition, see DAVID NOVAK, JEWISH SOCIAL ETHICS
22-44 (1992).
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it is not the hearers of the law who are righteous before God,
but the doers of the law who will be justified. When the Gen-
tiles who have not the law do by nature what the law requires,
they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the
law. They show that what the law requires is written on their
hearts, while their conscience also bears witness .... 24
Of course, once the revealed teachings began to challenge paganism,
the tradition of classical philosophy could not avoid its impact, and the
natural law tradition became integrated into (and enriched by) Christian
thought in the writings of St. Augustine and especially St. Thomas Aqui-
nas. In the most comprehensive expression of the premodern teaching on
natural law, Aquinas says in his Summa Theologica: "[The human being]
has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to
its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the
rational creature is called the natural law."2
Since many people today think of natural law thinking as a distinctively
Catholic phenomenon, it is worth observing that the Anglican divine
Richard Hooker adopts Aquinas' teaching on the subject with very little
change.26 And, despite his distrust of rationalism, Martin Luther is care-
ful not to dismiss "[tihe noble gem called natural law and reason [which]
is a rare thing among the children of men."27 Even John Calvin acknowl-
edges "that internal law, which,.., is in a manner written and stamped on
every heart,"2 though, to be sure, Calvin was Calvinist enough to insist
that it had been grossly distorted and obscured by sin.
I would not deny that there is a fundamental division in moral and
political thought between the ancient and medieval philosophers, on the
one side, and the moderns, on the other. What is of interest here, how-
ever, is not the profound points of divergence, but, rather, the common
belief in a natural law of personal and political morality that enabled Jef-
ferson to speak of ancient and modern authors together as responsible for
the "elementary books of public right" '29 whose teachings informed his
Declaration.
24. Romans 2:13-15.
25. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE IaIlae Q. 91, art. 2 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., 1948).
26. See Duncan B. Forrester, Richard Hooker, in HISTORY OF POLMCAL PHILOSO.
PHY, supra note 16, at 356, 358-59.
27. MARTIN LurHnR, Commentary on Psalm 101, in 13 LurHER'S WoRKs 146, 161
(Jaroslav Pelikan & Helmut T. Lehmann eds., Alfred von Rohr Saver trans., 1956).
28. JOHN CALvIN, INSTIuTEs OF THE CHRiSTIAN RELiGION 16 (Henry Beveridge
trans., 1966) (1536) (construing Romans 2:1-16).
29. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee, supra note 8, at 8.
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If St. Thomas Aquinas is the classic premodern natural law thinker, the
modem par excellence is John Locke. Echoing the dispassionate rhetoric
of "the judicious Hooker," Locke wrote that "[t]he State of Nature has a
Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which
is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health,
Liberty, or Possessions."3 Unfortunately, few men are "studiers" of the
natural law, yet "every Man hath a Right to punish the Offender, and be
Executioner of the Law of Nature."'" Thus, the urgency to escape the
uncertainties of the state of nature and institute governments that will
secure life, liberty, and property rights in part by creating a governmental
monopoly of the executive power.32 Like Locke, Algernon Sidney wrote
partly in response to the arguments for tyranny in Robert Filmer's book
Patriarcha.33 Both Sidney and Locke maintain that a sound account of
natural law provides the most persuasive bulwark against oppression.
Sidney writes:
[N]othing but the plain and certain dictates of reason can be
generally applicable to all men as the law of their nature; and
they who, according to the best of their understanding, provide
for the good of themselves and their posterity, do all equally
observe it. He that enquires more exactly into the matter may
find, that reason enjoins every man not to arrogate to himself
more than he allows to others, nor to retain that liberty which
will prove hurtful to him; or to expect that others will suffer
themselves to be restrain'd, whilst he, to their prejudice, remains
in the exercise of that freedom which nature allows. He who
would be exempted from this common rule, must shew for what
reason he should be raised above his brethren; and if he do it
not, he is an enemy to them. This is not popularity, but tyranny;
30. JoHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GovERNmENT 289 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed.
1967) (3d ed. 1698).
31. Id. at 290.
32. With thanks to Professor Russell Hittinger of Catholic University's School of Phi-
losophy for bringing my attention to this point, I cannot avoid noting that according to
Locke-who is often thought of as America's philosopher-when government refuses to
secure the natural rights of the people to life, liberty, and property, it effectively dissolves
itself and restores the state of nature. But this also brings back its "inconveniences," such
as private acts to punish or prevent the violation of third party natural rights, examples of
which include the shooting of abortionists and suspected child abusers by private citizens.
When individuals feel compelled to reassume their original Lockean right to execute the
natural law because government has unravelled the social contract by giving up its monop-
oly of the executive power, one Lockean inconvenience is the blurring of the line between
aggressor and defender as the state of nature comes to resemble a state of war.
33. SIR ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS (Johann P. Sommer-
ville ed., 1991) (1679).
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and tyrants are said.., to throw off the nature of men, because
they do unjustly and unreasonably assume to themselves that
which agrees not with the frailty of human nature, and set up an
interest in themselves contrary to that of their equals, which
they ought to defend as their own.'
"1yrannicide is a legitimate remedy, according to Sidney, when viola-
tions of natural rights by leaders chosen to secure those rights become
systematic and intolerable. "The tree of liberty," wrote Thomas Jeffer-
son, Sidney's disciple in the White House, "must be refreshed from time
to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants."35 Notice that Sidney's
defense of liberty, like any plausible defense of liberty, is a natural law
defense. His critique of tyranny, like any plausible critique of tyranny, is
openly moralistic. What is wrong with tyranny is not that it is unpopular
or economically inefficient or contrary to tradition; what is wrong with
tyranny is that it is unjust and, therefore, morally wrong.
As I have conceded, there are different and conflicting accounts or the-
ories of natural law and natural rights. There are particularly profound
differences on crucial points between the ancient and medieval thinkers
and the modems. For what it is worth, I agree with the ancients and
medievals on some of these points, particularly their perfectionist con-
cern with the inculcation of virtue, and with the modems on others, such
as the importance of civil and, particularly, religious liberty.3"
Nevertheless, virtually all the philosophers of the central tradition that
fed the American Founding shared with the authors of "the books of pub-
lic right" a belief in an order of natural law and justice (which the
moderns refer to aptly in terms of natural rights) that is what it is because
human nature, and therefore the human good, is what it is, and that this
moral order was constituted by principles accessible to reason that tran-
scend tastes, preferences, or subjective will.
When Jefferson claims that the Declaration of Independence was based
on the common sense of the ancients and modems that provided a har-
monizing sentiment, it is clear that natural law philosophy is at the very
core of this common sense.
When Madison pleads for New York to ratify the proposed Constitu-
tion, he returns in the forty-third Federalist paper "to the great principle
of self-preservation; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature's
God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the ob-
34. ALGERNON SIDNEY, DiscousEs CoNclrmo GovE RNimENT ii.20 (Thomas G.
West ed., 1990) (London, J. Toland 1698).
35. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William S. Smith (Nov. 13, 1787), in THm Pourr-
iCM. WRITNGs OF THoMAs JEFFERSON, supra note 8, at 68, 69.
36. See GEORGE, supra note 15.
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jects at which all political institutions aim, and to which all such institu-
tions must be sacrificed."37 The foundation of America's regime of
freedom and equality, the world's first liberal democracy, would be in-
comprehensible in terms that reject the idea of natural law and natural
rights.
The idea of "civil rights" currently enjoys a great deal of prestige in our
culture. Reverend King's prophecy from the Birmingham jail is already
being fulfilled:
One day the South will know that when these disinherited chil-
dren of God sat down at lunch counters, they were in reality
standing up for what is best in the American dream and for the
most sacred values in our Judaeo-Christian heritage, thereby
bringing our nation back to those great wells of democracy
which were dug deep by the founding fathers in their formula-
tion of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.
38
Unlike earlier generations, no one would be afraid today to be de-
scribed as a "civil rights leader," or even a "civil rights commissioner." In
large measure, we owe the fulfillment of Reverend King's prophecy to his
own words and actions. But it is important to keep in mind in reflecting
on the nature of civil rights and the future of the cause of civil rights that
King himself was careful to anchor the defense of civil rights, and of his
own actions in their behalf, in the idea of natural law and natural rights.
The supreme expression of his view is his Letter from Birmingham Jail,
the Pauline echo of which could hardly be accidental in the thought of a
Protestant minister. The entire letter, in my view, is a meditation on nat-
ural law and civil rights. Reverend King reminds his fellow clergymen
that in the tradition to which they, as Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, all
in one way or another participate:
[T]here are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the
first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but
a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a
moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with
St. Augustine that "an unjust law is no law at all."3 9
King slightly exaggerates his case here. We are not always morally ob-
ligated to disobey unjust laws and it is sometimes the case that we are
morally obligated to obey them, their injustice notwithstanding. This is,
however, a quibble. Seriously unjust laws never bind in conscience and
laws that require people to do that which is unjust may never rightly be
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 316 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
38. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail, in WHAT COUNTRY HAVE
I? POLmCAL WRITINGS BY BLACK AMERICANS 117, 130 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1970).
39. Id. at 121.
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obeyed.40 Civil disobedience in the face of seriously unjust laws is often
permissible and is sometimes requited. And that, I take it, is Reverend
King's point.
He continues:
Now, what is the difference between the two? ... To put it in the
terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that
is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. Any law that uplifts
human personality is just. Any law that degrades human per-
sonality is unjust. All segregation statutes are unjust because
segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality. It
gives the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segre-
gated a false sense of inferiority .... Hence segregation is not
only politically, economically and sociologically unsound, it is
morally wrong and sinful.... I can urge [disobedience to] segre-
gation ordinances, for they are morally wrong.41
Note that the violation of natural law, according to Reverend King, has
its worst effects by distorting the character of human beings. It is the
harm done to properly human powers in their proper development that
makes for the moral wrong of segregation. The harm would be in no way
ameliorated if, as a matter of false consciousness, the strong had per-
suaded the weak of the "justice" of segregation and made them content
with their condition. A happy slave is no less degraded in his nature by
his condition of servitude than is a rebellious one. The goods of human
nature are, as I have maintained, determinate. Human nature lacks the
plasticity and malleability to which the nihilist appeals in defense of the
will to power.
King then articulates the principle of justice whose violation in segrega-
tion laws accounts for their injustice:
An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority
group compels a minority group to obey but does not make
binding on itself.... By the same token, a just law is a code that
a majority compels a minority to follow and that it is willing to
follow itself.42
Now, as we have seen, Reverend King perceived that natural law en-
joins human beings to obey just laws and just authority. And even in the
defiance of unjust laws, he rejects the Nietzschean maxim that "every-
thing is permitted":
In no sense do I advocate evading or defying the law, as would
the rabid segregationist. That would lead to anarchy. One who
40. See FwnmNs, supra note 11.
41. King, supra note 38, at 121-22.
42. Id at 122.
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breaks an unjust law must do so openly, lovingly, and with a
willingness to accept the penalty. I submit that an individual
who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who
willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse
the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality
expressing the highest respect for law.
43
King saw, as no political or civil rights leader before or after him has
seen, that securing the civil rights of the descendants of those unjustly
enslaved under the "peculiar institution" of slavery was implicit in the
natural law principles to which America aspired but which, from the be-
ginning, she had failed to live up to.
Although his struggle was not easy and ultimately cost him his life, it is
unsurprising that Reverend King so accurately predicted the success of
the civil rights struggle that he embodied and has come to symbolize.
When the proponents of civil rights occupy the high ground of natural
law, and reject the nihilism that reduces everything to power, there is no
moral space left for the enemies of civil rights to occupy.
After King's martyrdom, however, many in the civil rights movement
lost the moral compass that King's philosophy of natural law and natural
rights provided. As traditional liberalism collapsed under the radical cri-
tique that has produced such phenomena as postmodernism, deconstruc-
tionism, radical feminism, and the like, many veterans of the civil rights
struggle bought into the moral radicalism of what former Vice President
Quayle accurately labeled a "cultural elite." For this elite, "natural law"
is a mere euphemism for legitimizing the status quo, thus reinforcing
structures of domination and power. At the same time, elite opinion re-
jects as, at best, benighted the idea of objective moral truth. Thus, no
truly rational critique of racism and other forms of unjust discrimination
is possible. There is, quite simply, the brute struggle for power. And the
noble cause of civil rights, to the extent that its advocates and spokesmen
accept this nihilistic outlook, is reduced to the status of a mere interest
group. Moreover, the eclipse of natural law thinking among those who
speak for the civil rights movement makes it difficult to say anything very
compelling about the problems of irresponsibility, drug abuse, promiscu-
ity, crime, and collapsing family structures in poor minority communities.
In the absence of a natural law philosophy of civil rights, the politics of
victimhood becomes understandable and perhaps even inevitable. But it
is an altogether inadequate philosophy to guide those who would com-
plete the task Reverend King so notably advanced.
43. Id.
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Unlike the politics of victimhood, natural law philosophy implies rights
and responsibilities. It is evenhanded in its condemnation of prejudice,
irrationality and injustice, whether of the right or the left. Its principles
are universal. A right is a right, whether the holder of the right is white,
black, or yellow; a wrong is a wrong, whether the perpetrator of that
wrong is male or female, rich, poor, or middle class.
Some people today say that the civil rights revolution has stalled.
Some call for a new philosophy of civil rights. What is needed, however,
is not a new philosophy but an old one, albeit an old one refreshed and
revivified. As we suffer the relativism and nihilism that have become or-
thodoxy in sophisticated political and academic circles (but whose conse-
quences bear hardest on the poor, the powerless, and the most vulnerable
of our people), we await the next Jefferson, Lincoln, or Reverend King to
recall us to the higher law that each of them so eloquently invoked in the
cause of ordered liberty and civil rights.
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